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EVIDENCE INTEGRITY MAINTENANCE
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ABSTRACT
Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) evidence
have become an important evidentiary focus in the courtroom. This type of evidence is
routinely produced as business records under U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence for use in the
emerging discipline of Forensic Cell Site Analysis. The research was undertaken to determine
if evidence produced by operators should be classified as digital evidence and, if so, what
evidence handling methodologies are appropriate to ensure evidence integrity. This research
project resulted in the creation of a method of determining if business records produced
by MNO/MVNO organizations are digital evidence and whether evidentiary integrity is
maintained in the conveyance of evidence between MNO/MVNO records custodians, law
enforcement investigators and attorneys in criminal and civil cases. Block-chain based
Distributed Ledger Technology was examined as a feasible evidence integrity maintenance
solution.
Keywords: Distributed Ledger Technology, DLT, Block-chain, Openchain, Charging Data
Records, Call Data Records, Call Detail Records
1. INTRODUCTION
A cell phone subscription in the United States
is activated with either a Mobile Network
Operator (MNO) or Mobile Virtual Network
Operator (MVNO), which includes a variety
of business models variously termed Virtual
Network Operator or Mobile Other Licensed
Operator. MNO/MVNO subscriber activity
records, technically defined in 3G standards
as Charging Data Records, are “a formatted
collection of information about a chargeable
event (e.g. time of call set-up, duration of the
call, amount of data transferred, etc) for use
in billing and accounting” (ETSI, 2015) and
commonly referred to as Call Detail Records
(CDR), fall into a class of evidence called
digital evidence. This type of evidence has
traditionally been introduced in the court-
room as business records evidence. Citing
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803, ex-
ceptions to the rule against hearsay, courts
have, with rare exception, accepted CDRs as
business records evidence. FRE 803 states in
part:
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“The following are not excluded by the rule
against hearsay, regardless of whether the
declarant is available as a witness:”. . .
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Ac-
tivity. A record of an act, event, condition,
opinion, or diagnosis if:
• (A) the record was made at or near the
time by—or from information transmit-
ted by—someone with knowledge;
• (B) the record was kept in the course
of a regularly conducted activity of a
business, organization, occupation, or
calling, whether or not for profit;
• (C) making the record was a regular
practice of that activity;
• (D) all these conditions are shown by the
testimony of the custodian or another
qualified witness, or by a certification
that complies with Rule 902 (11) or (12)
or with a statute permitting certification;
and
• (E) the opponent does not show that the
source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate a
lack of trustworthiness.”
the records should be subject to the same fun-
damental evidence handling standards and
rules as any other digital evidence.
The research for this project is based
upon patented scientific concepts and peer re-
viewed research as well as standards derived
from the 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP), International Organization for Stan-
dards (ISO), European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) and the Inter-
net Engineering Task Force (IETF), The 5G
Public Private Partnership (5G-PPP), the
American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) and the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) .
1.1 Digital Evidence Test
A four-part test was devised and applied to
MNO/MVNO evidence to determine if this
type of evidence should be subject to digi-
tal evidence handling and analysis standards.
The devised test is as follows:
• Is mobile network subscriber communica-
tions activity record keeping a computer
driven digital process?
• Are subscriber communications activity
records maintained by MNOs/MVNOs
and extracted for litigation purposes clas-
sified as digital evidence?
• Is this type of evidence subject to digital
evidence handling standards?
• Do the same rules for spoliation deter-
mination apply to this type of evidence?
When applied to a control group of
MNO/MVNO records produced as evidence
from a pool of 100 civil and criminal cases
the four-part test resulted in a positive deter-
mination that this class of evidence is indeed
digital evidence.
This conclusion led to an evidence spolia-
tion analysis of the control group of evidence,
Note that under rule 803, (6), Records of a 
Regularly Conducted Activity, MNO/MVNO 
produced evidence including Call Detail 
Records and other records meet the require-
ments as business records, if, according to 
(6)(E) the opponent does not show that the 
source of information or the method or cir-
cumstances of preparation indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness. (Federal Rules of Evidence, 
2019) This analysis will test the trustworthi-
ness of MNO/MVNO records production as 
business records under FRE803(6)(E).
The key questions that this research anal-
ysis project seek to answer are: 1) whether 
MNO/MNVO records should be recognized 
by courts as digital evidence and 2) whether
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consisting of over 700 evidence items, to de-
termine if any evidence items were tainted
during initial production and postproduction
conveyance between parties.
1.2 Evidence Spoliation/Taint
Analysis
The evidence spoliation analysis consisted of
a multi-part test applied to determine if any
evidence items exhibit positive indications for
spoliation. The test was designed to answer
the following questions:
• Is chain of custody documentation
present for the conveyance from the pro-
ducing MNO/MVNO to recipient(s)?
• What are the metadata creation and
modification dates of each evidence arti-
fact received?
• Is a modification date present indicating
post creation modification to the evi-
dence artifact?
• What are the metadata creation dates
and authorship of the content of each
evidence artifact?
• Is a modification date present indicating
post creation modification to the evi-
dence artifact and by whom?
• Has all metadata been removed from any
analyzed evidence artifact?
• Is a verification function cryptographic
hash value present for the original
production evidence artifacts (ASTM,
2018)?
2. BACKGROUND
Mobile Network Operators (MNO)/Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) ini-
tiated subscriber activity tracking for
billing purposes when analogue cellular was
launched in 1979. In 1996, the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) issued an
order for the Enhanced 911 initiative, aug-
menting mobile network billing records to in-
clude location information. Phase 1 required
that the location of the cell site to which a
subscriber device was registered during com-
munications be documented as part of the
record keeping process.
Multiple technologies are utilized within
mobile networks including radio frequency
isotropic propagation technologies, Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) com-
munications standards-based technologies,
patented communications flow technologies,
and a variety of data recording and gather-
ing technologies. This section will not at-
tempt to reiterate the corpora addressing the
MNO/MVNO technology layers utilized in
what are commonly referred to as 1G, 2G,
3G, 4G and 5G cellular communications but
rather will address the science and methodol-
ogy more directly applicable to the account-
ing and billing for subscriber communications
activities of a mobile phone.
CDRs as evidence were made available
from MNO/MVNO in response to the Com-
munications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act (CALEA) (1994), Wireless Communi-
cation and Public Safety Act (911 Act)
and Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) (1986) acts. This type of evidence
has become an important evidentiary focus
in the courtroom.
In the late twentieth century, Mobile Net-
work Operators (MNO)/Mobile Virtual Net-
work Operators (MVNO) began to produce
subscriber device activity records, otherwise
known as, Call Detail Records (CDR)/Cell
Site Location Information (CSLI) as evidence
in response to subpoena, search warrants and
court orders. The primary focus of the anal-
ysis of this type of evidence is two-fold: 1)
analysis of who was communicating with the
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subscriber and 2) where the subscriber device
was located during communications.
2.1 Forensic Cell Site Analysis
Forensic cell site analysis is a developing
forensic analysis discipline requiring founda-
tion knowledge of mobile network infrastruc-
ture and operations as well as an ability to
analyze and interpret Call Detail Record/-
Cell Site Location Information (CDR/CSLI)
and other Mobile Network Operator (MNO)
produced evidence. Forensic cell site anal-
ysis is a complex field incorporating radio,
atmospheric, photonic, wave propagation,
metrology and computer sciences, and is pri-
marily reliant on human estimations aided
by network testing, basic mapping, spread-
sheet and word processing software tools.
Under-developed algorithms embedded in au-
tomated tools currently used to process ev-
idence and perform a preliminary analysis
have resulted in a developing analysis capa-
bility in its nascent stage. Deficiencies in
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) or er-
rors in algorithms, tools, and processes leads
to incorrect findings, hence the necessity for
standard analysis, validation and error miti-
gation protocol development. The scientific
disciplines upon which forensic cell site anal-
ysis is dependent are often interlaced in com-
plex scenarios due to various factors includ-
ing:
• MNO infrastructure conditions and uti-
lization loading.
• Cell site to mobile switching core back-
haul issues.
• Subscriber and public event crowd be-
havior.
• Atmospheric events.
• Global network cyber-security events.
Basic understanding of the following areas of
science should be requisite to every practi-
tioner’s KSAs.
2.2 Radio Science
Radio science is central to forensic cell site
analysis despite the fact that typically less
than 5% of the communications path between
subscriber device and mobile switching core
consists of a radio connection. Radio fre-
quencies in use, communications technologies
utilized, electromagnetic radiation physics,
antenna radiation behaviors and other fun-
damental radio issues must be considered
during an analysis.
2.3 Atmospheric Science
Atmospheric science impacts the airgap of
mobile network linkage between subscriber
device and cell site. Antenna radiation
pattern and sizing in mobile subscriber de-
vices such as cell phones and mobile net-
work access points (Base Transceiver Station,
NodeB, eNodeB, gNodeB) may be affected
by heightened solar activity, certain precipi-
tation events, lightning strikes or near strikes,
and extremely high winds often affect mobile
network operation and radio signal propaga-
tion. Atmospheric impact can reduce, block,
destabilize or skew cell site coverage.
2.4 Photonic Science
Photonic science is the foundation of the
communications transportation infrastruc-
ture utilized in the remaining 95% of the
communications path between subscriber de-
vice and mobile switching core. Interruption
or congestion in segments of the photonic net-
work used as backhaul between cell sites and
mobile switching core may disrupt or reroute
communications, resulting in intermittent re-
pathing, often manifested as slowdowns or
interruptions in mobile communications that
result in dropped calls, out of sequence com-
munications events, or other anomalies.
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2.5 Wave Propagation Science
Wave propagation science has a direct bear-
ing on how radio signals propagate between
subscriber device and cell site. The wave func-
tion is a key feature of quantum mechanics
and radio wave scintillations including reflec-
tion, diffraction, refraction, absorption and
other scattering of radio signal propagation
at various frequencies, affected by objects in
the path between a subscriber device and
cell site, determine the extent and quality of
cell coverage. Defined as manmade or nat-
urally occurring objects varying in density
and height, morphologies include vegetal, ge-
ographic, building or other structures, streets,
waterways, and much more. Morphologies
impact wave propagation and thereby cell site
coverage. Antenna wave propagation behav-
iors must be considered during an analysis.
2.6 Metrology Science
Metrology, the science of measurement, is
utilized in forensic cell site analysis to elevate
the accuracy of analytical outcomes. An obvi-
ous example is the use of time and frequency
metrology in performing radio surveys for
mobile network testing. The units of mea-
surement result in a standard, meaningful
measurement of mobile network element per-
formance and impact the radio link analysis
between subscriber device and cell sites.
The photonic backhaul link between the
mobile network cell site and the mobile net-
work core is similarly subjected to link in-
tegrity quantification.
Location determination technologies uti-
lized by mobile network operators to geolo-
cate a subscriber device, the algorithms for
which utilize a variety of measurements, of-
fer another example of how the science of
metrology influences forensic cell site analy-
sis outcomes.
Standardized measurement units are criti-
cal to experimental and theoretical determi-
nations. Metrology establishes a standard
measurement basis for discussion of analysis
outcomes and resulting opinions.
From the evaluation of communications
session metadata to radio frequencies in use
during communications, time and frequency
metrology plays a primary role in forensic
cell site analysis.
The airgap between mobile network sub-
scriber device and cell site consists of less
than 5% of the path to the mobile net-
work core. The measurement of various
radio signal parameters and the associated
formulae for determining cell site coverage,
quality of service, handoff, and likelihood
of service outages are critical to determin-
ing analysis outcomes and the formation of
expert opinions. Examples include use of
several formula models including Okumura–
Hata Model, COST 231–Walfisch–Ikegami
Model, COST 207 GSM Model, ITU-R Mod-
els, 3GPP Spatial Channel Model, ITU-
Advanced Channel Model, and 802.15.4a
UWB Channel Model to determine pathloss
.
Dimensional Metrology is the science of
using measurement equipment to quantify
the distance from an object. Examples of the
use of measurement equipment in forensic
cell site analysis illustrate this usage.
Subscriber device location quantification in
forensic cell site analysis is dependent upon
location determination technology ranging
from highly accurate, finite location deter-
mination to wide-ranging, general location
determination.
Radio surveys of the network segments un-
der analysis, utilizing radio survey methodolo-
gies including idle mode and dynamic mode,
and specific location, cell, and wide area map-
ping utilize precise dimensional metrology to
determine handoff zones, sector coverage lim-
its, and mobile network void coverage bound-
aries.
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2.8 MNO/MVNO
Charging/Billing
Architecture
Mobile network subscriber activity records
are created during the usage of a subscriber
device, while registered to the MNO/MVNO
infrastructure and during communications
sessions transporting voice calls, SMS text
messages and data usage. Multiple mobile
network elements, including Home Location
Register (HLR), Visitor Location Register
(VLR), Charging Gateway Function (CGF),
and Policy and Charging Rules Function
(PCRF) are tasked with documenting device
usage and sending the activity records to a
Billing/Charging Gateway and subsequently
on to the Billing Domain, thereby creating
records that become the basis of customer
billing.
Charging Data Records, known as Call
Detail Records (CDRs), are subscriber com-
munications activity records produced from
the billing information database and are typ-
ically considered to be higher accuracy ac-
counts of device usage than a cell phone bill,
e.g. metadata time stamp accuracy to the
second rather than rounded to the minute,
etc.
The functional output of the charging/-
billing architecture has remained fundamen-
tally the same during the evolution from 2G
to 5G. The result has been highly accurate
recordkeeping of subscriber activities during
communications sessions, absent any errors
in recordkeeping resulting from network docu-
mentation or functionality issues, network or
billing domain configuration errors, or data
storage failures.
A logical diagram of 2G, 3G, 4G and 5G ar-
chitecture including an overview of the basic
network elements and reference connectivity
to the billing domain elucidates the concept
that mobile networks are complex systems.
These systems require significant knowledge
JDFSL V14N2
Optical metrology is the science and tech-
nology of measurements with photons. In 
forensic cell site analysis 95% of the commu-
nications linkage between subscriber device 
and mobile switching core is composed of pho-
tonic links. Understanding the measurement 
unit and normal link loss over segments of 
the photonic networks employed to transport 
communications sessions for a subscriber de-
vice on the mobile network is essential to 
calculating probabilities of network latency 
issues that may cause dropped calls, out of 
sequence text messaging, and other irregular-
ities in communications sessions.
Metrology assists decision making in the 
analytical process by quantifying measure-
ments and depending on type I (false posi-
tive) and type II (false negative) error rate 
determination.
Systematic errors usually originate within 
test and measurement instruments and occur 
due to instrument malfunction or improper 
use. Random errors occur by unknown and of-
ten unpredictable factors such as atmospheric 
conditions or morphologies introducing reflec-
tion, refraction or absorption of radio signals.
2.7 Computer Science
Computer science is fundamental to how the 
network elements that comprise the mobile 
network function and how accurately the 
MNO/MVNO subscriber device activities are 
logged to eventually become evidence in crim-
inal or civil litigation. A thorough under-
standing of the Transmission Control Pro-
tocol/Internet Protocol, addressing schemes, 
composition of the Internet including network 
elements, switched packet flow, and routing 
protocols is essential to understanding both 
computer and photonic sciences. An under-
standing of peering, transit and service level 
agreements enhances understanding and lu-
cidity regarding potential pathing issues that 
sometimes result in communications session 
sequencing irregularities.
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by analysts of the differences and complexi-
ties within each network generation.
The CDRs are extracted from larger
database systems within the mobile net-
work charging/billing infrastructure. The
integrity of evidence extracted from this data
repository is dependent upon the extraction
methodology employed by mobile network
legal production personnel and the handling
of the evidence post extraction. Mobile
network records custodians do not produce
any chain of custody documentation, how-
ever, in many instances the records custodian
prepares a notarized certification of records,
indicating, for example, that “such records
were kept in the course of regularly conducted
business activity”, that “the business activity
made such records as a regular practice” and
that “if such record is not the original, such
record is a duplicate of the original”. Typi-
cally, the certification letter lists the phone
number(s) and start and end dates of records
produced without listing, by name or other
means, the digital evidence items accompa-
nying the certification.
Various other records are also maintained
by various MNO/MVNO departments includ-
ing billing records, network maintenance logs,
real time and near real-time subscriber de-
vice location tracking logs, cell site database
records that include technical data about
each access point in the mobile network, con-
figuration data regarding how the mobile net-
work is configured, mobile network radio sur-
vey or drive test data, key performance in-
dicator data that exhibits the coverage and
health of the mobile network and other tech-
nical information about subscriber activities
or network conditions. All records, apart
from handwritten logs from physical cell site
access, of maintenance, upgrade and repair
personnel, are digital in origin and should be
considered digital evidence when produced
in court as evidence.
In the digital forensic science discipline,
digital evidence obtained from sources includ-
ing computer hard drive evidence and mobile
device (cell phone), is preserved using a chain
of custody methodology and must be proven
identifiable as true to the original evidence
produced to avoid preclusion by the courts.
Digital evidence integrity is assured with ver-
ification of metadata creation and modifica-
tion date/time preservation along with verifi-
cation function cryptographic checksum hash-
ing of each digital evidence item.
The International Organization of Stan-
dards (ISO) and the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) have published standards
for the acquisition, preservation and handling
of digital evidence, including the establish-
ment of chain of custody and evidence ver-
ification function. The National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) and
the American Society for Testing and Mate-
rials (ASTM) International have published
extensive forensic evidence guidance and stan-
dards documents for the acquisition, valida-
tion and analysis of computer and cell phone
evidence. Curiously absent are standards for
the handling, validation or error mitigation
of CDR/CSLI evidence in any of the afore-
mentioned standards bodies.
A method of validating cellular carrier
records for forensic cell site analysis is defined
in United States Patent US9113307 (Minor,
2015). Research has demonstrated that a
method for validation and error mitigation
of MNO/MVNO evidence should be utilized
to accurately complete a forensic cell site
analysis (Minor, 2017). As a prefatory to
performing validation and error mitigation
of a forensic cell site analysis, an examina-
tion of the condition of the MNO/MVNO
evidence is an important step that should be
performed prior to proceeding with analysis,
validation and error mitigation steps.
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Figure 1. 2G-3G-4G-5G Mobile Network / Charging/Billing Architecture
2.9 Mobile Network Toll &
Call Data Records Are a
Computer Driven Process
Other records are produced by
MNO/MVNO include a variety of logs,
technical configuration data for segments
of the mobile network, test data from radio
survey results, and billing records.
The basis for all mobile network CDRs is the 
toll or billing record database sourced from 
the MNO/MVNO charging/billing system. 
The CDR is the primary subscriber record 
produced for criminal and civil cases.
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2.10 Charging and Billing
System
The MNO/MVNO charging/billing sys-
tem necessarily maintains careful account-
ing of subscriber communications activi-
ties. The charging/billing system of each
MNO/MVNO is operated according to stan-
dards established by a variety of organiza-
tions, including national and international
bodies.
Charging Data Records, commonly known
as Call Detail Records (CDRs) are main-
tained and produced from a standards based
data flow to the Charging Gateway Func-
tion and into the CDR database in a format
established by standards.
2.11 3GPP/ETSI Standards
One of the applicable standards related
to billing and charging functionality, for ex-
ample, are specified within 3GPP TS 32.299
V12.6.0 (2014-10)(ETSI, 2014) 3rd Genera-
tion Partnership Project; Technical Specifi-
cation Group Service and System Aspects;
Telecommunication management; Charging
management; Diameter charging applications
(Release 8). These standards among others
are followed by MNO/MVNO in the United
States and virtually all other MNO/MVNO.
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) – European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) TS 32.297 v13.2.0
(2016-06) standard addresses Charging man-
agement; Charging Data Record (CDR) file
format and transfer, thereby clearly demon-
strating that MNO/MVNO records are digi-
tal evidence.
In Chapter 6 of TS 32.297 v13.2.0, CDR
file format specification, 6.1.1.0, General, the
exact format of the CDR file header is given
in table 6.1.1.1. This record keeping format
is indicative of entirely digital content. Note
that timestamps, file sequence numbers and
other important information is maintained,
according to this standard. (ETSI, 2016)
The following table, from chapter 6, provides
the data repository record layout for CDR
data:
Table 6.1.1.0.1: Format of CDR file header
(p.21)
CDRs are addressed extensively in the file
header and a variety of key indicators of the
digital nature of this record keeping activity
includes timestamp metadata, record num-
bers, file sequence numbers, record exten-
sion information and IP addressing of the
node generating the CDR file. The specifica-
tion concisely addresses how information is
recorded and integrity is maintained.
Metadata timestamps include when a CDR
file was opened, the local time differential off-
set from Universal Coordinated Time (UTC),
append and closure times.
Information integrity is addressed in this
format standard including number of CDRs
in a file, file sequence numbers, file closure
triggering and reasons for closure.
Finally, the specification provides for the
IP address of the Charging Gateway Func-
tion creating the CDR file and a Lost CDR
Indicator providing traceability of any error
conditions detected.
The specification continues below (p.22):
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6.1.1.5 File opening timestamp These
parameters indicate the time when the file
was opened, according to the following binary
format:
- The first four binary bits indicate the month
(1 .. 12), according to the CGF’s(ETSI, 2005)
local time zone;
- The next five binary bits contain the date
(1 :: 31), according to the CGF’s local time
zone;
- The next five binary bits contain the hour
(0 .. 23), according to the CGF’s local time
zone;
- The next six binary bits contain the minute
(0 .. 59), according to the CGF’s local time
zone;
- The next bit indicates the sign of the local
time differential from UTC (bit set to “1”
expresses ”+” or bit set to ”0” expresses ”-”
time deviation), in case the time differential
to UTC is 0 then the sign may be arbitrarily
set to ”+” or ”-”;
- The next five binary bits contain the hour
(0 .. 23) deviation of the local time towards
UTC, according to the CGF’s local time zone;
- The next six binary bits contain the minute
(0 .. 59) deviation of the local time towards
UTC, according to the CGF’s local time zone;
Note that the CDR file name contains de-
tailed date and time information related to
file closure (see clause 6.2)
taining more CDRs than represented by that
value) and shall therefore not be used.
6.1.1.8 File sequence number This pa-
rameter is a value in binary that contains a
running number of the CDR file generated
by the same CGF. The first file of a CGF is
indicated by the value ”0”. When the max-
imum number of file is reached (all bits set
to “1”), the sequence shall be restarted with
”0”.
6.1.1.9 File closure trigger reason The
file closure reason provides a means to deter-
mine the reason that the file was closed by
the CGF. It is encoded as a single octet as
follows:
Normal closure reasons (Binary values 0 to
127):
0 = Normal closure (Undefined normal clo-
sure reason).
1 = File size limit reached (OAM&P config-
ured).
2 = File open-time limit reached (OAM&P
configured).
3 = Maximum number of CDRs in file
reached (OAM&P configured).
4 = File closed by manual intervention.
5 = CDR release, version or encoding change.
6 to 127 are reserved for future use.
Abnormal closure reasons (Binary values 128
to 255):
128 = Abnormal file closure (Undefined error
closure reason).
129 = File system error.
130 = File system storage exhausted.
131 = File integrity error.
132 to 255 are reserved for future use.
6.1.1.10 Node IP address This param-
eter indicates the IP address of the CGF
generating the file. For both IPv4 and IPv6
CGF addresses, the parameter is encoded
in IPv6 representation. The first four bytes
of the parameter, which are [preceding] this
IPv6 address, are insignificant, e.g. filled
with ’FF’.
6.1.1.6 Last CDR append timestamp 
This parameter is formatted the same as in 
clause 6.1.1.5, and indicates the time when 
the last CDR was appended to the file in 
UTC format. In case of an empty file (i.e. no 
CDRs included), the value of the parameter 
is ”0”.
6.1.1.7 Number of CDRs in file This 
parameter contains a binary value that spec-
ifies the total number of CDRs that are in-
cluded in the file.
The value with all bits set to “1” is reserved 
for future extensions (e.g. for CDR files con-
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6.1.1.11 Lost CDR indicator This pa-
rameter indicates if and how many CDRs
were lost during their processing in the CGF
(see clause 5.1.1). The term ”lost” implies
that the CDR(s) could not be placed into the
destination file due to irrecoverable errors.
Due to the possibility that the irrecoverable
CDR errors may have impacted CDR param-
eters that are relevant for CDR routeing, it
is possible that the CGF cannot determine
for a particular file whether CDRs have been
lost. Appropriate indication shall be given
according to the following encoding of the
”lost CDR indicator”.
- MSB bit “0”, all other bits “0”: no CDRs
have been lost;
- MSB bit “0”, all other bits set to a value
corresponding to decimal 1 to decimal 126:
CGF has identified that a number of CDRs
corresponding to the value of the lower 7 bits
were lost, while it is unknown whether more
CDRs were lost;
- MSB bit “0”, all other bits set to “1”: CGF
has identified that 127 or more CDRs were
lost, while it is unknown whether more CDRs
were lost;
- MSB bit “1”, all other bits “0”: CDRs
have been lost but CGF cannot determine
the number of lost CDRs;
- MSB bit “1”, all other bits set to a value
corresponding to decimal 1 to decimal 126:
CGF has calculated the number of lost CDRs
as indicated in the value of the lower 7 bits;
- MSB bit “1”, all other bits set to “1”: CGF
has calculated the number of lost CDRs to
be 127 or more.” (ETSI, 2016)
2.12 Digital Evidence
Integrity Maintenance
Standards
ISO (The International Organization for
Standardization) and IEC (The International
Electrotechnical Commission) form the spe-
cialized system for worldwide standardiza-
tion. National bodies that are members of
ISO or IEC participate in the development
of International Standards through techni-
cal committees established by the respective
organization to deal with specific fields of
technical activity. (ISO, 2012)
ISO 27037, Section 5.4, titled “Digital ev-
idence handling processes”, Section 6 titled
“Key components of identification, collection,
acquisition and preservation of digital evi-
dence”, and Section 6.1, titled “Chain of cus-
tody” (ibid), address the global standards
for digital evidence handling including collec-
tion, acquisition, preservation and chain of
custody.
The introduction to ISO 27037 states in
part . . . “These processes are required in
an investigation that is designed to main-
tain the integrity of the digital evidence – an
acceptable methodology in obtaining digital
evidence that will contribute to its admissibil-
ity in legal and disciplinary actions as well as
other required instances. This International
Standard also provides general guidelines for
the collection of non-digital evidence that
may be helpful in the analysis stage of the
potential digital evidence.”
The standard continues with the follow-
ing statement: “This International Standard
also intends to inform decision-makers who
need to determine the reliability of digital
evidence presented to them. It is applicable
to organizations needing to protect, analyze
and present potential digital evidence.” . . . ”
Due to the fragility of digital evidence, it is
necessary to carry out an acceptable method-
ology to ensure the integrity and authenticity
of the potential digital evidence.”
Under Section 1, Scope, the standard de-
lineates applicable devices as ” . . . devices
and/or functions that are used in various
circumstances:
— Digital storage media used in standard com-
puters like hard drives, floppy disks, optical
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and magneto optical disks, data devices with
similar functions,
— Mobile phones, Personal Digital Assistants
(PDAs), Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs),
memory cards,
— Mobile navigation systems,
— Digital still and video cameras (including
CCTV),
— Standard computer with network connec-
tions,
— Networks based on TCP/IP and other digi-
tal protocols, and
— Devices with similar functions as above.”
MNO/MVNO networks are a composite of
several of the listed devices including “net-
works based on TCP/IP and other digital
protocols”, “digital storage media used in
standard computers”, “mobile navigation sys-
tems”, “mobile phones, personal digital as-
sistants”, “standard computer with network
connection”, and “devices with similar func-
tions as above”.
Under Section 3, Terms and Definitions,
several definitions were found to be relevant
to this analysis, including:
“3.1 acquisition
process of creating a copy of data within a
defined set Note 1 to entry: The product of
an acquisition is a potential digital evidence
copy.”
“3.5 digital evidence
information or data, stored or transmitted
in binary form that may be relied on as evi-
dence”
“3.6 digital evidence copy
copy of the digital evidence that has been
produced to maintain the reliability of the ev-
idence by including both the digital evidence
and verification means where the method of
verifying it can be either embedded in or in-
dependent from the tools used in doing the
verification”
“3.1 preservation
process to maintain and safeguard the in-
tegrity and/or original condition of the po-
tential digital evidence”
“3.19 spoliation
act of making or allowing change(s) to the
potential digital evidence that diminishes its
evidential value”
“3.22 timestamp
time variant parameter which denotes a point
in time with respect to a common time refer-
ence
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 11770-1:1996]”
“3.25 verification function
function which is used to verify that two sets
of data are identical
Note 1 to entry: No two non-identical data
sets should produce an identical match from
a verification function.
Note 2 to entry: Verification functions are
commonly implemented using hash functions
such as MD5, SHA1, etc., but other methods
may be used.”
ASTM International establishes that “con-
fidence in digital and multimedia evidence
forensic results is best achieved by using an
error mitigation analysis approach that fo-
cuses on recognizing potential sources of error
and then applying techniques used to miti-
gate them, including trained and competent
personnel using tested and validated methods
and practices”. (ASTM, 2018)
All MNO/MVNO networks are pervasively
integrated into the network of networks com-
monly called the Internet. Voice, text and
data communications over the cellular net-
work traverse the Internet from cell sites to
MNO/MVNO network core (Cisco, 2011).
The Scientific Working Group on Digital
Evidence (SWGDE) discipline guidance in
Recommendations for Cell Site Analysis con-
firms that “if use of the records [CDRs] in
court is anticipated, it is important to pre-
pare to meet any applicable rules of evidence
requirements”. (SWGDE, 2017)
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The Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) provides guidance and standardiza-
tion for handling digital evidence in RFC
3227. The standard states in part “. . . you
should consider generating checksums and
cryptographically signing the collected evi-
dence, as this may make it easier to preserve
a strong chain of evidence. In doing so you
must not alter the evidence.” (IETF, 2002)
The National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), in the publica-
tion “Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics”
(NIST, 2007), verifies that all digital evidence
must be handled using an appropriate chain
of custody and a forensic hash validation of
the evidence. NIST defines each of the pro-
cedures as follows:
• “Forensic Hash Validation: A forensic
hash is used to maintain the integrity of
an acquisition by computing a crypto-
graphically strong, non-reversible value
over the acquired data. After acquisition,
any changes made to the data may be de-
tected, since a new hash value computed
over the data will be inconsistent with
the old value. For non-forensic tools,
hash values should be created using a
tool such as sha1sum and retained for in-
tegrity verification. Even tools labelled
as forensic tools may not compute a cryp-
tographic hash, and (in these cases an
integrity hash should be computed sepa-
rately).”
• “Chain of Custody – A process that
tracks the movement of evidence through
its collection, safeguarding, and analy-
sis lifecycle by documenting each person
who handled the evidence, the date/time
it was collected or transferred, and the
purpose for any transfers.”
The Forensic Hash Validation is an integral
part of the scientific digital forensics step
process.
The verification function mentioned in ISO
27037 is best performed by comparing two
digital evidence artifacts using a forensic hash
validation.
2.13 Role of Metadata Date &
Time
An important method of determining if
digital evidence is spoliated is to analyze
metadata creation and modification times
and authorship of digital evidence artifacts.
Documents such as Microsoft Word, Excel
Spreadsheets or Adobe PDF’s can also be an-
alyzed for content creation and modification
metadata, including authorship to further
enhance the accuracy of digital evidence spo-
liation analysis.
Metadata creation and modification dates/-
times should be identical if copies of digital
evidence have not been tainted. Absence of
this information is an important positive in-
dicator of spoliation, absent the presence of
verification function hash values.
NIST publication “Guide To Integrating
Forensic Techniques Into Incident Response”
describes external file metadata as follows
- File Modification, Access and Creation
Times.
It is often important to know when a file
was created, used, or manipulated, and most
OSs keep track of certain timestamps related
to files. The most commonly used times-
tamps are the modification, access, and cre-
ation (MAC) times, as follows:
• Modification Time. This is the last time
a file was changed in any way, including
when a file is written to and when it is
changed by another program.
• Access Time. This is the last time
any access was performed on a file (e.g.,
viewed, opened, printed).
• Creation Time. This is generally the
time and date the file was created; how-
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ever, when a file is copied to a system,
the creation time will become the time
the file was copied to the new system.
The modification time will remain intact.
A method of validating cellular carrier
records accuracy for forensic cell site analysis
is defined in United States Patent US9113307.
The process includes a multi-part test to vali-
date CDR/CSLI records and an analysis error
mitigation methodology.
At least one MNO/MVNO has concluded
that this evidence is digital evidence and
should be treated as such. In 2013, AT&T
Mobility acquired Cricket Wireless, a prepaid
mobile network provider (Mobile Virtual Net-
work Operator or MVNO). Cricket Wireless
uses the AT&T infrastructure to process com-
munications for its subscribers and the
AT&T Mobility charging/billing system
provides usage records to Cricket Wireless.
Cricket produces CDR/CSLI evidence for its
subscribers in response to legal requests and
offers the following disclaimer when digital
copies of CDR/CSLI evidence is produced
and emailed to a requesting party:
“At the request of the law enforce-
ment agency receiving the following
Subpoena Compliance information,
Cricket Communications (”Cricket”)
provides the following information
electronically in a searchable, manip-
ulable form. Although Cricket veri-
fies the authenticity of the informa-
tion attached to this e-mail as sent,
Cricket cannot and will not testify to
the authenticity of this information
after it is received by the recipient
law enforcement agency. This is be-
cause the attached information elec-
tronically sent by Cricket is manipu-
lable.” (Pennsylvania Superior Court, 2016)
3. RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
The analysis was performed in four phases as
follows:
Different types of filesystem may store differ-
ent types of times. For example, Windows 
systems retain the last modified time, the last 
access time, and the creation time of files. . . ” 
(NIST, 2006)
2.14 Error Rates
MNO/MVNO have documented error rates 
in subscriber activity records that, to date, 
have not been publicly disclosed. Research 
performed during validation and error mit-
igation testing on over 300,000 pages of 
MNO/MVNO produced evidence realized er-
ror rates that approach 2% in some cases 
(Minor, 2017).
The previously mentioned 3GPP/ETSI TS 
32.297 standard, Section 6.1.1.11 Lost CDR 
indicator, mentions error rates; however, in 
hundreds of cases analyzed, and many cases 
in which a MNO/MVNO employee testified, 
none has ever disclosed any error rate infor-
mation. The standard states in part ”This 
parameter indicates if and how many CDRs 
were lost during their processing in the CGF 
(see clause 5.1.1). The term ”lost” implies 
that the CDR(s) could not be placed into the 
destination file due to irrecoverable errors.”
Studies performed on the Movistar - Tele-
fonica Chile Mobile Network Operations re-
sulted in creation of a methodology to analyse 
time accuracy in post-mediation (postpaid 
billing) CDRs (Peredo, 2017). In this study, 
recorded CDR events were compared with 
actual logging events using a network event 
measurement tool. Although the analysis 
results were inconclusive, the methodology 
exhibits promise that more accurate error 
models for the CDR record keeping function 
are arriving and that error rates are quantifi-
able.
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3.1 Phase I
A four-part test was applied to first de-
termine if MNO/MVNO subscriber activity
records should be subjected to digital ev-
idence handling and analysis standards as
follows:
• Is MNO/MVNO subscriber communica-
tions activity record keeping a computer
driven digital process?
• Are subscriber communications activity
records, extracted for litigation purposes,
digital evidence?
• Is this type of evidence subject to digital
evidence handling standards?
• Do the same rules for spoliation deter-
mination apply to this type of evidence?
3.2 Phase II
The control group of MNO/MVNO digi-
tal evidence was reviewed for the presence of
any chain of custody documents. Note that
any certification letters provided by records
custodians do not list evidence items by doc-
ument name, number or other confirmable
identifier.
3.3 Phase III
The MNO/MVNO CDR evidence was then
subjected to a five-part metadata analysis
using the following protocol:
• Internally within each digital evidence
item, any document “creation date”
metadata including date and author.
This portion of the analysis was doc-
umented under the Internal Document
Metadata categorization.
• Internally within each digital evidence
item, any document “modification date”
metadata including date and author.
This portion of the analysis was doc-
umented under the Internal Document
Metadata categorization.
• Internally within each digital evidence
item, any document “last printed date”
metadata including date and author.
This portion of the analysis was doc-
umented under the Internal Document
Metadata categorization.
• Externally, any valid original creation
date metadata for each digital evidence
item. This portion of the analysis was
documented under the External File
Metadata categorization. (NIST, 2006)
• Externally, any valid original modifica-
tion date metadata for each digital evi-
dence item. This portion of the analysis
was documented under the External File
Metadata categorization.
3.4 Phase IV
Finally, a verification function analysis was
performed to determine that the copy of the
evidence is identical to the evidence produced
by the MNO/MVNO custodian of records in
the following manner:
• Each evidence item was scrutinized for
a verification function cryptographic
checksum hash value. A cryptographic
checksum hash value should have been
calculated on the original and any copy
of the evidence item.
• If a verification function cryptographic
hash value was found, then a crypto-
graphic hash value was calculated for
the produced evidence item for the pur-
pose of comparison and final verification
that the original evidence item and the
evidence item produced are identical.
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Microsoft Excel, a spreadsheet database
software product, was utilized to document
the chain of custody analysis, metadata anal-
ysis, verification function analysis outlined
above and document the presence or absence
of spoliation. All information in the matrix
is independently verifiable.
4. OUTCOMES
4.1 Phase I - Business
Records – The Question of
Digital Evidence
Are Mobile Network Records Produced as
Evidence Actually Digital Evidence?
Analysis of MNO/MVNO CDR evidence
was undertaken from the research control
group of cases to determine if each evidence
artifact should be classified as digital evi-
dence by applying the devised four-part test.
All evidence items tested positive as digital
evidence.
The following outcomes were observed for
Phase I:
1. Is MNO/MVNO subscriber communica-
tions activity record keeping a computer
driven digital process? Yes, standards
for digital record keeping methods and
formats clearly affirm this question.
2. Are MNO/MVNO subscriber communi-
cations activity records, extracted for
litigation purposes, classified as digital
evidence? Yes, the records are created
digitally by computing-based methods
and the extracted reports produced are
digital evidence and, thus, are purely
digital from inception to production.
3. Is this type of evidence subject to digital
evidence handling standards? Yes, all
digital evidence is subject to the same
evidence handling standards.
4. Do the same rules for evidence spolia-
tion determination apply to this type
of evidence? Yes, no exceptions to the
standards are addressed.
4.2 Phase II - Chain of
Custody Issue
No chain of custody documentation accom-
panied any of the evidence. Chain of custody
documentation should have been created and
forwarded with the CDR evidence from the
MNO/MVNO legal department/custodian of
records and all others conveying the evidence.
The Custodian of Records certification let-
ters were present in many cases. When such
documents were present, the certifications
did not describe or specify which files, doc-
uments or other digital evidence were being
provided, by file name, traceable number or
any other recognizable, traceable or account-
able method.
The following outcomes were observed for
Phase II:
None of the digital evidence items were
accompanied by chain of custody documen-
tation.
4.3 Phase III - Evidence
Condition Observations
and Findings
A spoliation analysis of the MNO/MVNO
CDR evidence produced the following results:
1. Observation: MNO/MVNO CDR evi-
dence within the control group was pro-
duced in a variety of digital formats
including Microsoft Excel spreadsheet
file, comma-separated values (CSV) file
(IETF, 2005) (typically opened automat-
ically by Excel), plain text file, Rich Text
File (RTF) file, Adobe Portable Docu-
ment Format (PDF) file, Joint Photo-
graphic Experts Group (JPEG) file, and
Microsoft Word Document file.
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Figure 2. Outcomes Summary
2. Observation: MNOs/MVNOs began to
offer degraded evidence production as
pressure to respond to escalating de-
mand during recent years. Observed
manifestations were typically either re-
moval of all creation/modification meta-
data, creation of documents using meth-
ods that produce no creation/modifica-
tion metadata, multiple employee (au-
thor) creation/modification metadata,
or removal of employee (author) meta-
data combined with differing creation
and modification metadata. Examples of
appropriate creation/modification meta-
data were rarely found within the control
group.
Figure 3. MNO evidence item example in-
dicating appropriate evidence creation and
handling
Examples of tainted evidence is indicated
in significant percentages of MNO/MVNO ev-
Figure 4. MNO evidence item example inter-
nal metadata with proper artifact integrity
idence when multiple authors are discovered
during analysis of metadata.
1. Observation: MNO/MVNO CDR pro-
duction formats vary widely in content
and arrangement of data. Contrary to
guidance provided in SWGDE Cell Site
Analysis that states that “Even if CDRs
are provided, which include specific lat-
itude and longitude references to the
antennas used by a target device, it is
necessary to have the neighboring cell
site locations and information to con-
duct CSA more thoroughly”, production
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Figure 5. MNO evidence item example pre-
senting multiple authors with no metadata
date changes. The Last Modified by author is
consistent with changes by a different author
from some MNOs/MVNOs do not pro-
vide neighboring cell site locations.
2. The National Domestic Communi-
cations Assistance Center (NDCAC,
2018) is provided extensive support by
MNOs/MVNOs, specifically supplying
lists of cell sites with technical config-
urations for each site to NDCAC. A
request to NDCAC for access to the
cell site database receives an access de-
nial from NDCAC personnel with the
message “Users who access our systems
must acknowledge and attest they are
an employee of a law enforcement or
Figure 6. MNO evidence item example pre-
senting multiple authors and disparate cre-
ation and modification dates metadata evi-
dence taint
criminal justice agency, in good stand-
ing and are accessing this U.S. Govern-
ment system for official use only”. Until
MNOs/MVNOs provide the information
produced in a data repository that is ac-
cessible to all stakeholders / practition-
ers, or, an acceptance of MNO/MVNO
evidence as digital evidence transpires,
performing any verification of authentic-
ity or validation of the condition of this
category of evidence will continue to be
a challenge.
The following outcomes were observed for
Phase III:
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Figure 7. Results of the Phase III Analysis
1. Analysis of the internal file metadata
present within the evidence revealed that
only 0.41% of the internal metadata cre-
ation dates had been altered.
2. Various authorship was indicated in
internal file creation and modification
metadata in 10.9% of the control group
analysis.
3. The last modified date, according to
internal file metadata, was not consis-
tent with pristine evidence condition in
23.17% of the evidence.
4. 20.14% of the evidence was found to
have been scrubbed of internal file meta-
data creation / modification information,
thus rendering the evidence subject to
undetectable, inappropriate alteration.
The most commonly observed evidence
with such missing metadata was Comma
Separated Values or CSV data, a method
of saving spreadsheet files, commonly
used to eradicate any indications of au-
thorship or metadata creation/modifica-
tion information. CSV format evidence
from the control group is from more re-
cent cases.
5. External file metadata for last modified
date was found to be tainted in 37.79%
of the evidence.
6. Overall, excluding the tests for chain of
custody and verification function hash
value presence, 74.07% of evidence re-
viewed from the control group were
found to be tainted.
7. Evidence taint was introduced ei-
ther carelessly or nefariously by
MNO/MVNO employees, law enforce-
ment investigators, attorney staff
or others involved in handling and
conveyance of evidence.
8. 100% of the evidence was found to have
no chain of custody documentation.
9. 100% of the evidence was found to have
no calculated verification function cryp-
tographic checksum hash values.
4.4 Phase IV – Verification
Function Calculated Hash
Value Analysis
The following outcomes were observed for
Phase IV:
None of the digital evidence items were ac-
companied by a cryptographically calculated
verification function checksum hash value.
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Figure 8. Evidence Spoliation/Taint was Discovered Throughout the Stakeholder Spectrum
5. EVIDENCE
INTEGRITY
MAINTENANCE
SOLUTIONS
MNOs/MVNOs do not currently utilize a
mechanism to properly preserve the integrity
of evidence produced in criminal or civil case
requests. Research into multiple existing or
emerging chain of custody/verification func-
tion technologies resulted in potential solu-
tions to the evidence integrity maintenance
challenge.
5.1 Background and
Incentives
Key incentives for MNO/MVNO adoption of
a solution are likely to be the following:
• Ease of integrating a solution into exist-
ing charging/billing architectures.
• Judicious Capitalization (CAPEX) and
Operating (OPEX) Expenses.
• Timeliness and performance speed of ev-
idence integrity preservation processing.
• Ability for the solution to be assimilated
by each successive generation of the mo-
bile network.
MNO/MVNO evidence production is
clearly a process lacking uniformity between
operators, varying widely in internal evidence
extraction techniques. Format and content
of evidence production also varies widely.
Standards are non-existent for uniform
MNO/MVNO evidence extraction, format,
integrity assurance or delivery methods. The
widespread use of this type of evidence in
criminal and civil cases necessitates an ur-
gent need for evidence production and man-
agement protocols that incorporate chain of
custody, verification function hash value gen-
eration and maintenance of evidence integrity
assurance, none of which are currently uti-
lized by MNO/MVNO nor other digital plat-
forms such as social network, search engine,
or other digital service providers during evi-
dence production.
This research project undertook develop-
ment of a simplified solution to MNO/MVNO
evidence production protocols that would pro-
vide a relatively low cost, state of the art
evidence integrity assurance mechanism that
meets basic digital evidence handling stan-
dards. MNO/MVNO operations are complex,
ultra-busy environs with an exponential rise
in communications volume and evidence pro-
duction expected in the coming years, con-
sequently any solution would necessarily be
efficient and effective.
Numerous proven and patented methods for 
evidence integrity maintenance currently ex-
ist and this paper explores one such solution.
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5.2 Distributed Ledger
Technology/Block-chain
Research
Block-chain/Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT)(Gramoli, 2018) offers a promising solu-
tion to digital document authentication and
verification. Block-chain paradigms such as
Bitcoin and other open source technologies,
e.g. Openchain (Openchain, 2019), provide
for a distributed ledger-based chain of cus-
tody and verification function checksum hash
value generation for each evidence artifact, en-
abling an analyst to verify evidence integrity.
Numerous service providers currently offer
document authentication and verification ser-
vices that utilize Block-chain/DLT protocols.
Incorporating a built-in Block-chain/DLT
client during the evidence production process
would eliminate the evidence spoliation/taint
issues discovered during this research project
and would introduce readily validated evi-
dence that is synonymous with digital evi-
dence in all other digital forensics disciplines.
Block-chain/DLT provides key elements of a
functional architecture that ensure validity
and integrity of digital evidence.
Fundamental DLT Architecture
The architecture of Distributed Ledger Tech-
nology is articulated in several elements.
(Gramoli, 2018)
The Consensus Element (p.19) is a funda-
mental function of a Block-chain providing a
“distributed voting process”. Protocols that
are both scalable and secure will be required
to accommodate the rapidly growing world
of MNO/MVNO evidence production.
The Security Element (p.20) is critical to
authentication and integrity, providing mali-
cious user protections.
The Validation Element (p.20) is the asym-
metric cryptographic system used to create
necessary public and private key pairs, us-
ing technologies currently available including
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (IETF,
2011) algorithms. Despite security
concerns regarding early ECC algorithms
adopted by NIST (NIST, 2000) almost 20
years ago, more current ECC including Curve
25519 (IETF, 2016) offer security levels with
exponentiated Elliptical Curve Digital Signa-
ture Algorithm (ECDSA) protections.
The Ownership Element (Gramoli, p. 20)
enables transfer of evidence copy while ensur-
ing authenticity and integrity. DLT transac-
tion language offers the opportunity for such
transfer of digital assets between accounts
while maintaining evidence integrity.
All entities requesting evidence production
from an MNO/MVNO would be dealt with
uniformly as follows:
1. As evidence extraction from the
MNO/MVNO occurs a Block-
chain/DLT process is incorporated
during evidence production to create
a chain of custody and a public key is
utilized to encrypt each evidence item.
2. Using Block-chaining transaction tech-
niques during the encryption process, a
ledger-based chain of custody and verifi-
cation function hash value calculation is
automatically created.
3. Each evidence artifact is transmitted to
an evidence portal to be accessed by
the evidence requesting entity. Evidence
items are decrypted by authorized par-
ties, producing a chain of custody result-
ing in self-auditing evidence artifacts.
4. An evidence integrity checking mecha-
nism is integrated into the same portal,
resulting in the ability for anyone who
has access to the evidence to determine
the condition of the evidence.
To validate the effectiveness of the
use of Block-chain/DLT protocols with
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Figure 9. Comparison of Bitcoin Financial Transaction and MNO/MVNO Evidence Transac-
tion Paradigms
Figure 10. Data Flow for the MNO/MVNO Compliance Center Evidence Production with
Built-in Distributed Ledger
MNO/MVNO evidence, an experiment was
conducted using MNO/MVNO produced evi-
dence to authenticate and provide condition
verification services for each evidence item.
The experiment consisted of several steps
as follows:
1. Creation of a user ID on the website of a
provider offering DLT digital document
authentication and verification services.
2. Two MNO/MVNO evidence items were
then processed into the portal. The time
to perform an intake varied from 15-45
seconds (processing time is primarily re-
lated to digital file size and Internet ac-
cess bandwidth). Processing timeliness
may be a critical function for MNOs as
the volume of evidence requests soars.
3. The evidence artifacts were then digi-
tally signed, creating the digital ledger-
based chain of custody documentation
required.
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Figure 11. Example test Block-chain processing of MNO/MVNO evidence
4. The intake, verification function hash
value calculation and signature process
required a total of 1-2 minutes to per-
form for each evidence artifact. The
final step in this process, notarization,
required a short pause for verification of
steps 1-3.
5. At this stage in the process the evid-
nce receipt is available, and the evidence
item is available to download by the re-
questing party.
Block-chain/DLT research (Bonomi 2018)
(Lone 2019) has produced similar methods for
evidence processing, demonstrating that at
least conceptually, this is a potential solution
that MNOs/MVNOs, and tech giants such
as Facebook, Google and other technology
platforms could readily integrate to introduce
an evidence integrity maintenance process to
legal records production as evidence.
Alternative solutions to the evidence
integrity maintenance conundrum for
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integrity, and with affirmative evidence spoli-
ation/taint indicators, such evidence should
be precluded by a court.
The use of a variety of existing methods
for maintaining the integrity of digital evi-
dence offers an opportunity to bring much
needed integrity to MNO/MVNO evidence
production.
Use of Block-chain based DLT technol-
ogy, researched and tested as an evidence
integrity maintenance solution, would per-
mit MNO/MVNO organizations to create
chain of custody and verification function
cryptographic hash value calculations during
evidence production. The process could be
performed with minimal human interaction,
requiring no trusted third party while ensur-
ing that evidence integrity endures during
evidence conveyance among parties.
Further performance and conformity
testing will ultimately evolve an ade-
quately robust mechanism for preserving ev-
idence integrity in MNO/MVNO environs.
MNOs/MVNOs work together continuously
to create global standards for the operation
and inter-operation of mobile networks world-
wide. No published standards work has oc-
curred to jointly create a uniform evidence
production format or evidence handling, in-
tegrity maintenance and conveyance proto-
cols.
5G and future Generations of mobile net-
works are expected to continue to produce
increasing volumes of evidence as continu-
ous connectivity between subscribers reaches
ubiquity and use of this evidence in criminal
and civil cases becomes ever more prolific.
MNOs/MVNOs cooperate with govern-
ment and law enforcement entities necessarily
as a requirement of CALEA and other acts.
The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) regulates radio frequency spectrum in
the United States yet has no oversight regard-
ing evidence produced by MNOs/MVNOs.
Determination whether evidence produced
JDFSL V14N2
MNOs/MVNOs include the use of a digital 
certificate, by ”[i]nserting the certifica-
tion into the file”, research of which has 
demonstrated, “is the only apparent reliable 
method and is the approach used by leading 
companies such as Microsoft and Adobe for 
digital signing of Office and PDF documents” 
(Curran 2017) offer potential resolution of 
this issue, however may be cumbersome to 
integrate.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The MNO/MVNO evidence analyzed dur-
ing this research project was determined to 
be digital evidence. Subsequently, the evi-
dence was subjected to a multi-part spolia-
tion/taint test and examined to validate if 
each digital evidence artifact was identical 
to the evidence originally produced by the 
MNO/MVNO records custodian.
Over 74% of the evidence was determined 
to be spoliated/tainted based upon an anal-
ysis of the metadata creation/modification 
dates and/or authorship for each evidence 
artifact.
National and international standards for 
the preservation, integrity maintenance and 
handling of digital evidence were not followed 
in 100% of the evidence.
Neither chain of custody documentation 
nor verification function cryptographic hash 
values were found to be present within any of 
the evidence, further eliminating any oppor-
tunity to validate that the evidence analyzed 
was an exact copy of the original evidence 
produced by the MNO/MVNO.
If any evidence from the control group was 
offered as digital evidence in a court proceed-
ing it should be precluded from admission as 
valid evidence based on the findings from this 
research. If challenged under FRE 806 (6)(E), 
absent adequate chain of custody documen-
tation, verification function cryptographic 
checksum hash calculations ensuring evidence
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by MNOs/MVNOs is permissible in a court-
room as business records under FRE 803 (6)
or is required to be treated as digital evi-
dence falls under the scope of the United
States Federal Judiciary. A persuasive ar-
gument using FRE 803 (6)(E) could result
in a judicial decision that the current prac-
tice of introducing this evidence in a court as
business records is an obsolete paradigm for
MNO/MVNO evidence acceptance by courts,
resulting in a shift in judicial precedent for
this issue. The increased use of this type of
evidence in criminal and civil cases could also
result in U.S. Congress deciding to regulate
these decisions through legislation to ensure
that constitutional rights are upheld.
Only when MNOs/MVNOs follow well es-
tablished digital evidence preservation, in-
tegrity maintenance and handling protocols
will pristine evidence be found throughout
the life cycle of a civil or criminal case.
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